### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

MAGALENE BOWERS PETERSON,	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	
VS.	§	Civil Action No. 4:11-CV-777-Y
	§	
JOE KEFFER, WARDEN,	§	
FMC-CARSWELL,	§	
Respondent.	§	
FMC-CARSWELL,	§ §	

## FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:

#### I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

#### A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

#### **B. PARTIES**

Petitioner Magalene Bowers Peterson, Reg. No. 06158-017, is a federal prisoner incarcerated in FMC-Carswell in Fort Worth, Texas.

Respondent Joe Keffer is Warden of FMC-Carswell.

#### C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 16, 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess 38.2 grams of crack cocaine with intent to

distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and 846, and one count of being a principal to distribution of more than five grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Panama City Division, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 120 months, or 10 years, as to the first count and 12 months, or 1 year, as to the second, the sentences to run concurrently. (Resp't App. at 1-9) *United States v. Peterson*, U.S. Pacer, Criminal Docket for Case No. 5:05-CR-22-RH-WCS-1. Petitioner did not directly appeal her convictions or sentences. On February 26, 2008, petitioner filed a motion for a reduction of her 120-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in the convicting court based on the intervening decision in *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (3005), and, on May 30, 2008, she filed a motion for reduction of sentence based on "retroactive Amendment 706" of the sentencing guidelines. (Resp't App. at 10-17) The convicting court denied the motions, stating—

The defendant Magaline Bowers Peterson has moved for a sentence reduction under United States Guidelines Amendment 706. The amendment reduces the guideline range for most crack cocaine offenses. But the amendment makes no change in any applicable mandatory sentence. Mr. Peterson was sentenced to the minimum mandatory term of 10 years. She is not eligible for a reduction.

(Resp't App. at 18-19)

Petitioner filed this federal petition under § 2241 in this division, where she is currently incarcerated. She raises two grounds for habeas relief: Her sentence was improperly enhanced based on (1) a prior conviction and (2) "application of two points for 'recency' which is no longer considered." (Pet. at 4-5) The government has filed a response seeking dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. (Resp't Resp. at 2-4)

#### D. DISCUSSION

Typically, § 2241 is used to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. Warren v. Miles, 230 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2255 is the primary means under which a federal prisoner may collaterally attack the legality of his or her sentence. Cox v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1990). A § 2241 petition attacking a federally imposed sentence may be considered, under the so-called "savings clause" of § 2255(e), if the petitioner establishes that the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention. Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000). The burden of demonstrating the inadequacy of the § 2255 remedy rests with the petitioner. Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001). In order to meet this burden, a petitioner must show that his or her claim is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner's trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion. Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2010); Reves-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). The first "factor requires that a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision establish that the petitioner is actually innocent," meaning that he "may have been imprisoned for conduct that was not prohibited by law." Jeffers, 253 F.3d at 830–31.

Petitioner is unable to satisfy this factor by merely claiming that the district court improperly applied sentencing enhancements because the claim does not rely on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision showing that she was convicted of a nonexistent offense. Further, petitioner claims she had no knowledge of her right to file a § 2255 motion prior to expiration of the time allocated to do so. (Pet. at 7) The fact that petitioner is barred under the

statute of limitations from bringing a motion under § 2255, however, does not render the § 2255 remedy inadequate. Petitioner cannot rely on § 2241 to avoid procedural hurdles presented under § 2255, such as the one-year statute of limitations. *Pack v. Yusuff,* 218 F.3d 448, 453 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (citing *Toliver*, 211 F.3d at 878 (holding that prior, unsuccessful § 2255 motion, the limitations bar, and successiveness do not render the § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective).

Petitioner has not made the showing required to invoke the savings clause of § 2255 as to the claims presented in this habeas corpus proceeding, and the court is therefore without jurisdiction to consider the petition. *See Padilla v. United States*, 416 F.3d 424, 427 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005); *Christopher v. Miles*, 342 F.3d 378, 385 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003).

#### II. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

# III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

#### IV. ORDER

It is further ordered that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.

JEFFREY L. CURETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE